NCC
Impact Assessment of 2013 Mobile Termination Rate (MTR) Regime

Strictly Private and Confidential

February 2018
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Executive summary
The aim of this study is to assess the impact of the 2013 MTR regime

Objectives of this study:

• Assess the impact of the 2013 MTR regime on the Nigerian telecoms market, focusing on:
  • Market / subscriber growth
  • Competition
  • The relationship between on-net and off-net tariffs
  • The evolution of retail tariffs
  • Impact of denoming MTRs in local currency
  • Impact of asymmetric MTR on improving market conditions
• Review whether asymmetric MTRs should be used by the NCC going forward
We looked at the 2013 Nigerian MTR regime and sought to test six hypotheses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hypotheses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The interconnection regime has allowed the Nigerian telecoms market to continue to develop well from 2013 to 2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The level of competition has not decreased since the introduction of the 2013 MTR regime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On-net and off-net retail rates will converge if MTRs are set at, or close to, costs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The MTR regime has put downward pressure on retail prices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denominating MTRs in Naira could cause problems in case of currency devaluation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It is unclear whether asymmetry has had a positive impact on the Nigerian telecoms market</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
The implementation of the 2013 interconnection regime allowed a positive development of the market

From 2013 to 2016, the Nigerian telecoms market has developed well across a variety of metrics:

- In line with other countries, the Nigerian market has been growing in terms of subscriber numbers since 2013

- Off-net retail voice tariffs had decreased from c. N36.00 in 2009 to c. N17.30 in 2012. Following the 2013 determination prices continued to fall to N12.60

- Over the same time period, off-net and on-net retail voice tariffs have converged. This suggests an increase in market competitiveness (due to reducing switching costs)

- There is mixed evidence on the effect of asymmetric termination rates. It appears that these have had limited impact on new entrants or small operators

The positive impact MTR regulation on market development suggests that the interconnection regime implemented in 2013 has allowed the market to continue to develop well

However, it appears that the single MTR regime, which was irrespective of call origination, could have been misinterpreted by operators abroad (see ITR benchmarking report)
MTR impact assessment
In 2013 the NCC set out a revised interconnection regime which included asymmetry and a converging glide path

### Determination of voice interconnection rates (Naira, April 2013 – April 2016)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Voice Termination Rates per minute</th>
<th>Start date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>New Entrants and Small Operators</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N6.40</td>
<td>Six Naira Forty Kobo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N5.20</td>
<td>Five Naira Twenty Kobo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N3.90</td>
<td>Three Naira Ninety Kobo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Other Operators</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N4.90</td>
<td>Four Naira Ninety Kobo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N4.40</td>
<td>Four Naira Forty Kobo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N3.90</td>
<td>Three Naira Ninety Kobo</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Key Points**

- The termination rate glide path determined by the NCC in 2013 is shown in the table.
- The MTR regime implemented had the following features:
  - was cost based,
  - used a glide path,
  - asymmetric, trending towards symmetric rates
  - denominated in Naira, and
  - used the same charge for fixed and mobile termination
- This report assesses the impact of the determination, evaluating effect of cost-based, regulated, asymmetric termination rates set in Naira for a three year period between April 2013 to April 2016

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**Note:**
- A “New Entrant” is defined as newly licensed Operator entering an existing or new market within 0 to 3 years.
- Small Operator is defined, for the purpose of this Determination, as an existing Operator with a market share of 0 – 7.5% in terms of subscriber base.
- Same MTR for fixed and mobile calls.
The MTR glide path set out by the NCC in 2013 had a continuous downward trend towards N3.90

### Implications

- While all operators were subject to the same interconnection rates at the beginning and end of the 2013 MTR regime period, small/new operators benefited from a smoother glide path.
Our approach to assessing the impact of the 2013 MTR regime comprises several strands of analysis

### Impact Assessment Approach
- Set objectives
- Develop hypotheses to be tested
- Define data requirements
- Identify data sources
- Collect data

### MTR Impact Assessment Focus Areas
1. **Market**: Growth of the Nigerian telecoms market from 2009 to 2016
2. **Market share**: Evolution of operators’ market shares from 2009 to 2016
3. **Convergence**: Convergence of on-net and off-net retail voice tariffs
4. **Prices**: Evolution of retail tariffs in Nigeria from 2009 to 2016
5. **Local currency**: The effects of determining MTRs in local currency
6. **Asymmetry**: Effects of asymmetry on Nigerian telecoms market. Experience from other countries

### Concluding Tasks
- Summarise the main implications from the MTR impact assessment
- Draw conclusions regarding the NCC’s interconnection regime going forward

Although the focus of this impact assessment is the 2013 interconnection regime we have analysed data going back to 2009 in order to be able to identify potential changes in trends etc. that might have occurred as a result of the 2013 implementation.
Subscriber numbers and penetration have continued to grow after the introduction of the 2013 regime

- Subscriber growth rates have been falling internationally (as an increasing proportion of the population own mobile phones).
- Nigeria’s subscriber growth rate has remained above those of Morocco, Tanzania and Algeria (and, more recently, Ghana)

• Subscriber market penetration increased from 20% in 2007 to 45% from in 2016
• Growth of the market penetration in Nigeria was in line with other countries in the region (CAGR around 10%), and higher than in some of the more mature North African markets but lower than in Ghana and Tanzania

It should be noted that the growth in subscriber numbers and penetration occurred despite decreasing incentives for multiple SIM ownership

Sources: GSMA
According to the HHI index the market is moderately concentrated and improved slightly from 2013

**Key Points**

- Herfindahl-Hirschman (HHI) index score measures market concentration, with lower index scores indicating less market concentration and consequently – more competition in the market.
- The following operators were included in the market concentration estimation: MTN, Glo, Airtel, Etisalat, others.
- Overall, market concentration has remained largely flat, albeit with a slight decrease from 2013 to 2016.
- This suggests a slight increase in market competition.

**Nigeria Mobile Operators Market Concentration (HHI Index, 2009 – 2016)**

Sources: NCC, GSMA
Off-net and on-net retail voice tariffs have fallen considerably and converged almost entirely

Average Retail Tariffs for Voice Calls (NGN/min, 2009, 2016)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Off-net</th>
<th>On-net</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>36.0</td>
<td>26.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>12.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Implications

- The average cost of making an on-net call has fallen by 64% from 2009 to 2016 (in nominal terms)
- Whilst the average cost of making an off-net call has fallen by 69% over this time period
- Since 2009, the off-net tariffs have converged to the on-net tariffs which is what one would expect in a world where MTRs equal unit costs
- In Nigeria, this development has been accelerated, and possibly largely driven, by regulatory intervention (the obligation on the dominant operator to collapse on-net and off-net differential following the Determination of Dominance in Selected Communication Markets in Nigeria, NCC, April 2013)

Sources: NCC
Since 2009, retail prices for voice services have fallen in line with MTRs

MTRs in Nigeria

Off-net Peak Voice Retail Tariff in Nigeria
(NGN/min, 2007 – 2016)

- In 2009, the Commission set the MTR to converge to N8.20 by 2012, with an asymmetric benefit to smaller operators
- In 2013, the Commission then set the MTR to converge to N3.90 by 2016, with an asymmetric benefit to smaller operators

- From 2009 to 2016, the off-net peak voice retail tariff declined by ~65% from N36.00 to N12.60
- The decrease in voice retail prices since 2009 has been in line with the decrease in MTRs (64.9% and 66% respectively).
- Most of the decline in retail prices occurred from 2008 to 2013, following which prices remained relatively flat (most likely due to cost pressures)

Sources: NCC

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However, the depreciating Naira has made it challenging for telecoms to cover the costs of providing services.

Key Points

- In 2016, Naira declined by 34.6% in relation to USD.
- This resulted in the following:
  - an immediate cost increase for operators across internationally traded goods, USD denominated loans, USD based co-location, tower charges, and others.
  - a gradual increase of labour costs through domestic inflation.
- However, a USD denominated MTR would have led to an excessive increase (in Naira terms) of MTRs and upward pressure on retail tariffs.

Sources: Bloomberg
There is mixed evidence on whether asymmetric rates benefitted Nigerian small operators from 2009 to 2016

Asymmetric MTRs in Nigeria (NGN/min, 2009 - 2016)

Subscribers Market Share & HHI in Nigeria (%, 2009 – 2016)

- In 2009, the Commission set MTRs to converge to N8.20 by 2012, with an asymmetric benefit to smaller operators
- In 2013, the Commission then set MTRs to converge to N3.90 by 2016, with an asymmetric benefit to smaller / new operators

Sources: GSMA, NCC

- During the 2009-2012 asymmetric MTR regime, Etisalat increased its revenue market share from 4% to 13%
- The HHI has remained relatively flat since 2009, but the market share of the largest operator has decreased
While Etisalat has grown its market share over 2009 - 2012 as the asymmetric MTR regime was implemented...

- Asymmetry appeared to have allowed Etisalat to launch services at lower price points (compared to Nigerian average)
- In 2009, Etisalat launched the Easy Cliq package which offered the cheapest off-net call rates of 25 kobo/s compared to the industry average of 60 Kobo/s

Sources: NCC, GSMA

From 2009 to 2012, Etisalat subscriber market share increased from 4% to 13%
Asymmetry potentially enabled Etisalat to competitively price its services in order to drive uptake and market share
...there is no clear evidence that asymmetry supported an increase in market competition over 2013 - 2016

In 2013, the operators benefitting from the ‘small operator’ MTR rate only had 2.1% share of the Nigeria subscriber market.

Asymmetry was not applicable to MTN, Glo, Airtel and Etisalat as their subscribers market shares exceeded the 7.5% threshold to be considered a ‘small operator’.

Sources: NCC, GSMA

There is no clear evidence that asymmetry enabled small CDMA operators to develop in the market as:

- Most CDMA operators lacked the scale to leverage cost savings gained from the 2013-2016 asymmetric MTR regime
- Zoom Mobile and Starcomms exited the market in 2014
- MTN acquired Visafone in 2015

Dec. 2015: NCC approved MTN’s acquisition of Visafone
End 2014: Zoom Mobile and Starcomms shut down operations
Moreover, three 4G operators have recently entered the Nigerian telecoms market in the absence of asymmetry.
Conclusions
MTR regulation should be upheld going forward. It is unclear whether asymmetry would have positive impact

From 2009 to 2016, the Nigerian telecoms market has developed well across a variety of metrics...

• The Nigerian market has been growing since 2013, with a CAGR of around 10% in subscriber terms
• From 2009 to 2016, off-net retail voice tariffs have decreased from N36.00 to N12.60
• Over the same time period, off-net and on-net retail voice tariffs have converged. This is compatible with cost based termination rates, and counteracts multiple sim ownership
• There is mixed evidence on the effect of asymmetric termination rates. It appears that these have had limited impact on small operators

...however, asymmetry might not necessarily improve market competition compared to symmetric MTRs

• Although asymmetry appeared to initially made a positive impact, it did not last with most of small operators exiting the market. Post asymmetry small 4G-only operators were able to enter the Nigerian market in 2016
• Considering the past development of the Telecom industry it appears that asymmetry will have limited impact on small operators
• Evidence is mixed regarding whether asymmetry is effective in supporting small operators’ growth in other markets comparable to Nigeria

Given the proven positive impact MTR regulation has had on the Nigerian telecoms market, the NCC should continue to regulate MTRs going forward

It is unclear that asymmetric rates had impact on market competition with most of small / new operators existing the market prior to 2016 and new entrants coming in post asymmetry
3 Conclusions

**The NCC’s proactive approach to MTR regulation is in line with regulatory insights / international precedent**

- Call termination represents a bottleneck (a market in which each operator has SMP)
- The NCC does not leave MTRs to bilateral negotiations
- Instead, it takes an active role in setting MTR based on unit costs (using LRIC+)
- The development of MTRs is based on the evolution of unit costs over time, and glide path adjustments

- Regulators around the world have moved towards cost based regulation of MTRs
- A number of regulators have implemented asymmetric MTRs
- Glide path approaches have also been used by many regulators (in order to avoid excessive one-off adjustments)

- Since the NCC moved towards cost based interconnection rates in 2009 and its review in 2013, the market has seen strong growth, prices have fallen, and the asymmetry between on-net and off-net calls has decreased
- New entrants have come to the market in absence of asymmetry in 2016

**Setting termination rates by the NCC**

**Aligning with what is done elsewhere**

**The Nigerian market has continued to develop well**
### Re-cap: We have assessed 6 hypothesis in relation to the input of the 2013 MTR regime

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hypotheses</th>
<th>Findings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The interconnection regime has allowed the Nigerian telecoms market to develop well from 2013 to 2016</td>
<td>From 2009 to 2016, the Nigerian telecoms market has developed well across a variety of metrics, including subscriber growth and market penetration.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The MTR regime has increased market competition</td>
<td>The HHI Index suggest that market concentration has decreased slightly following the adoption of new termination rates in 2013, increasing market competition and decreasing concentration.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On-net and off-net retail rates will converge if MTRs are set at, or close to, costs.</td>
<td>On-net and off-net retail voice tariffs have converged from 2009 to 2016, which suggests MTRs have been set at, or close to, costs. This convergence tends to reduce incentives for undesirable multiple sim ownership.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The MTR regime has put downward pressure on retail prices</td>
<td>Over a period of time, retail prices for voice services have declined in line with MTRs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denominating MTRs in Naira could cause problems in case of currency devaluation</td>
<td>Naira depreciation made it challenging for Telecom operators to cover costs, but a USD denominated MTR would have led to an excessive increase (in Naira terms) of MTRs and upward pressure on retail tariffs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It is unclear whether asymmetry has had a positive impact on the Nigerian telecoms market</td>
<td>There is mixed evidence as to whether asymmetric MTR regimes have led to an increase in market competitiveness from 2009 to 2016 with operators exiting in asymmetric regime and entering in the symmetric regime.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix: International Experience

In this appendix, we are providing information on interconnection regimes in other countries, specifically in relation to:

• Whether interconnection rates are regulated based on costs
• Whether interconnection rates are asymmetric
• Market characteristics (e.g. market concentration, market shares of operators, etc.)

This is done with the aim of comparatively assessing whether MTR regimes have improved market conditions where implemented
International regulators tend to set cost based MTRs, with only a few adopting a Bill-and-Keep (BAK) regime

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Example countries</th>
<th>Rationale for setting up the regime</th>
<th>Method used to set up the regime</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Algeria, Argentina, Benin, Botswana, Colombia, Germany, Morocco, Niger, Peru, Poland, Senegal, Sweden, Tanzania, UK, ...</td>
<td>The purpose of setting cost based MTRs, is to avoid cross subsidies and to remove incentives to turn off phones. Foster a competitive market by lowering on-net – off-net price differentials to ensure consumers have less incentive to switch operators. Drive retail rates lower to benefit consumers. Adopt asymmetry policies to help smaller players to survive and tackle the problem of imbalance of payments. Bring mobile interconnection rates closer to fixed interconnection rates, which will enhance fixed-mobile competition. Increase off-net traffic. Help to resolve disputes among operators. Essential to adhering to international mandates.</td>
<td>Mostly cost-based approach. Some countries such as Ghana adopts a combination of cost-based and benchmarking approaches.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MTR regime</th>
<th>BAK regime</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>US, Canada, Mexico, Hong Kong, Singapore, New Zealand</td>
<td>Avoid high fixed administration and regulatory costs relative to the benefits that would be gained if there were no transactions costs associated with identifying and setting theoretically optimal MTRs in small markets. Avoid resources in modelling. Avoid resources in lengthy disputes. Operators would be recovering all their costs from their own retail customers. Gives the operators strong incentives to both increase their customer base and encourage traffic.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Regulators reports

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South Africa’s voice tariff appear to have declined in-line with MTRs

The Independent Communications Authority of South Africa (ICASA) regulates MTRs based on the operators’ long-run incremental costs (LRIC) and has reduced MTRs over time. Average voice revenue per minute has fallen over time in line with the reductions in MTR, suggesting that regulating MTRs has led to lower average call charges for consumers.

Sources: GSMA, ICASA Call termination regulation Sep 2014, Buddecomm, Telegeography (Q2 2015), TeleGeography, Ovum
Tanzania implemented a big step change reduction in 2013, followed by a gradual decrease in MTRs

- In March 2013 the Tanzanian regulator reduced MTRs by 68.8% to TZS34.92 per minute
- The new glide path will end in 2017 at TZS26.96 per minute

Average voice revenue per minute has fallen over time in line with the reductions in MTR. However, it is noted that the reductions in MTR have been rather irregular during this period

Sources: Ovum, Buddecomm, GSMA
Morocco’s regulation seems to have lowered voice tariffs, although only one MTR reduction recently occurred

MTR in Morocco (MAD/min, 2009 – 2016)

Average voice revenue per minute in Morocco (MAD/min, 2009 – 2013)

The Moroccan regulator (Agence Nationale de Reglementation des Telecommunications, ANRT) has reduced the MTR for many years, although recently MTRs appear to have been frozen

Sources: Ovum, GSMA

Average voice revenue per minute has fallen over time in line with the reduction in MTR. However, it is noted that the reduction in MTR occurred only during the start of this time period
Many countries in Africa and the Middle East set symmetrical MTRs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Date of last market analysis</th>
<th>Cost methodology used</th>
<th>Asymmetry between MTRs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Cost-plus</td>
<td>Asymmetrical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>August 2010</td>
<td>BU-LRIC</td>
<td>Symmetrical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>December 2013</td>
<td>TD-LRIC</td>
<td>Symmetrical from January 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>March 2013</td>
<td>LRIC+</td>
<td>Symmetrical as of April 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oman</td>
<td>December 2013</td>
<td>LRIC</td>
<td>Symmetrical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>September 2010</td>
<td>BU-LRIC</td>
<td>Symmetrical from 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>October 2014</td>
<td>LRIC+</td>
<td>Asymmetrical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>March 2013</td>
<td>FL-LRIC</td>
<td>Symmetrical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>December 2012</td>
<td>LRIC</td>
<td>Symmetrical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>May 2012</td>
<td>LRIC</td>
<td>Symmetrical</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Ovum
In Belgium, there is a correlation between asymmetry and the small operator’s market share growth

Asymmetric MTRs in Belgium (EUR Cents/min, 2001 - 2013)

Revenue Market Share & HHI in Belgium (%, 2000 – 2013)

- Asymmetry was used from 2001 to 2013, when rates converged

Sources: IBPT, GSMA

- During the 2001-2013 asymmetric MTR regime, Base and Mobistar managed to increase their revenue market shares by 18pp and 11pp respectively
Similarly, in Italy, asymmetry appeared to have helped small operators gain more revenue market shares.

**Asymmetric MTRs in Italy (EUR Cents/min, 2008 - 2014)**

- Asymmetry was used from 2008 to 2014, when rates converged.

**Revenue Market Share & HHI in Italy (% 2008 – 2014)**

- The asymmetric MTR regime enabled Wind and Three to increase their revenue market shares in the Italy telecoms market.

Sources: IBPT, GSMA
However, in the UK, it is not clear whether asymmetry correlates with the growth of small operators

Asymmetric MTRs in UK (£ Pence/min, 2007 - 2012)

- Ofcom introduced asymmetric MTRs in 2007, with rates converging in 2011

Revenue Market Share & HHI in the UK (%, 2007 – 2012)

- Three benefited from the asymmetric MTR regime from 2007 to 2011 and managed to increase its market share from 7% to 10%

Sources: Harbord, D. and Hoernig, S., Welfare Analysis of Regulating Mobile Termination Rates in the UK, GSMA
In Colombia, there is no correlation between asymmetry and small operators’ market share growth

- In November 2012, the CRC introduced an asymmetry regime to limit Claro’s mobile market dominance

**Sources:** Ovum, GSMA

- Despite decreases in asymmetric MTR, Claro has increased its market share while smaller operators have struggled to gain market shares, challenging the assumption that asymmetric MTR would increase competition levels